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Abstract 
This paper focuses upon the effect of Temporary Help Agencies (THAs) on 
occupational mobility through a comparison of the job-to-job upgrading chances of 
THA and non-THA workers. A screening approach to the role of these labor “brokers” 
suggests that agency workers can expect greater upgrading chances between two 
different occupations. Results obtained from a sample of Spanish workers show that 
working through these intermediaries allows workers in intermediate occupational 
levels to avoid occupational demotions more easily than non-THA ones. Moreover, 
THAs improve the probability for high-skilled workers of achieving a permanent 
contract. The empirical analysis demonstrates that the existence of self-selection is an 
important explanation for increased occupational mobility among THA workers in 
Spain. 
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1. Introduction
Temporary Help Agencies1 (THAs) offer employment contracts of a limited dura-
tion to jobseekers and assign them to client firms wishing to hire them to perform
jobs of a temporary nature. The Spanish labour market reform in 1994 –which
for the first time allowed those agencies to operate– has focused attention on
these labour market intermediaries and their role in the functioning of this labour
market, the one with the highest unemployment rate in Europe (almost 20% on
average throughout the nineties). From then on, THA contracting has become a
growing area, actually accounting for almost 16% of the total number of tempo-
rary contracts in Spain (see Table 1). Furthermore, the percentage of temporary
contracts in Spain is the highest one in Europe: more than 30% of total workers
throughout the nineties. Hence, the incidence of THAs in this labour market is
of particular interest not only for politicians but also for labour economists.
Attempts to analyze this phenomenon are by no means lacking although THA
work has been one of the most heated debates of recent years. Yet, research has not
explained the role that these agencies play in relation to workers’ careers. Career
prospects of agency workers are either assumed or considered as a by—product of
the pernicious social reality that these agencies are supposedly hiding. Indeed,
the opponents to Temporary Help Agencies present as their main argument that
the existence of these agencies exacerbates the inherent insecurities of the labour
market2.
Unlike this line of research, our main argument is that this intermediary may
be viewed as a screening device within the structuring of the employment relation-
ship. We focus on the effects of THA work on occupational mobility and compare
them to non—THA workers. Our main argument is that THAs offer a unique
screening device that matches the individual with the most appropriate skill-level
to the job in question. This can help relatively high—qualified workers and, hence,
they may use THAs as a way of signalling their quality, given the likely prospect of
obtaining higher chances of upward occupational mobility through this signalling
1Several other terms are commonly used for the companies that employ individuals to send
them out to other worksites at other companies: staffing companies (the term preferred by the
companies themselves), agencies (the traditional term), and temporary help supply companies
or services (the term used by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics).
2Common criticisms are that (1) THA workers only receive brief assignments interspersed
with relatively long periods of unemployment (Bronstein, 1991); (2) that not only are THA
workers paid less than core workers for working at similar types of jobs, but also that their
chances of obtaining employee benefits are less than those for traditional core workers (Emerson,
1988; Moberly, 1987); (3) that such a situation may create uncertainty and greater economic
risk for these workers (Blank, 1998); and (4) that extensive reliance on THA workers may create
two classes of employees: permanent workers with relatively secure, high—paying employment
and THA workers (along with temporary workers in general) who have only sporadic, low—paid
work (Mangum et al., 1985).
process. Thus, agency workers may be able to advance more quickly in their ca-
reers (in terms of both their occupational level and the type of contract held).
It is with this issue that the present analysis is concerned. To conduct such an
analysis, we investigate the question of the self-selection process underlying the
decision to address to a THA to find a job. Those who choose to do so may be
more able and/or more motivated than those who choose to rely on their own.
Moreover, it may well be the case that workers apply to THAs only after direct
methods to find a job have proved fruitless. Hence, self-selection is an important
issue for our empirical approach which will be based on a switching model for
occupational mobility. We specifically ask two questions: (i) Had they chosen not
to address to a THA, what would be their performance?, and (ii) What would
be the performance of non-THA workers had they decided to work through the
agency?
To do so, we use a a recent data source, Social Security records, which pro-
vides complete employment histories of a sample of workers –some of whom work
through THAs. We find support for a positive self-selection of THA workers be-
longing to the highest occupational category compared to non-THA individuals.
Our empirical results show that highly qualified THA individuals would have en-
joyed a much lower probability of access to permanent contracts had they chosen
not to address to the agency. Our results also give support to a story of negative
self-selection for THA individuals in the lowest occupational category. Individ-
uals engaged through THA in this occupational group would have shown better
performance –both in terms of access to permanent contracts and of avoiding
occupational demotion– had they decided not to address to this intermediary.
Finally, the effect of working through a THA for workers in an intermediate occu-
pational level basically consists of a lower likelihood of having to accept new jobs
with lower skill requirements.
To our knowledge, this is the first systematic analysis of career prospects asso-
ciated to THA work. This important aspect of the labor market has been virtually
ignored in the economic literature, mainly due to the absence of accurate databases
to fill this gap. Intermediation of THA may affect worker employment prospects
through three different ways: the time the worker needs to find a job, the quality
of the job found or the future career prospects the THA is offering to the worker.
The effect of THAs over the duration of both employment and unemployment
spells is analyzed in García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2003). They find that al-
though job tenure through THAs is lower than without these intermediaries, the
main advantage offered for workers is that unemployment spells in between two
jobs is shorter than for non-THA workers3. However, it is the latter issue, the
3In spite of the absence of data on wages, our dataset offers another signal of the quality of
the job found: the proportion of workers in an occupational level higher than the one in the first
job of their work history is 25.82% for no-THA workers whereas it is 35.34% through THAs.
2
one investigated in the present paper, which we consider to be the most relevant:
the future career prospects of THA workers. This is also the first study on such
an issue to take explicitly into account the possible existence of self—selection into
THA—intermediated work by using a switching model. In addition, since upward
movements along the occupational trajectory are generally accompanied by ap-
propriate wage increments, our study is related to the extent to which workers
engaged through these intermediaries have improved chances of increasing their
labour earnings over time4.
We organize the paper as follows. Firstly, we briefly offer some data on THA
contracting in Spain, revise the motivations most frequently cited behind this
phenomenon and present the predictions upon which the empirical research is
conducted. Secondly, we describe the data and the econometric model used in our
analysis. Thirdly, we present the empirical results. The last section puts forward
our main conclusions.
2. The THA industry: A brief background
In Spain, THAs have only been under formal government regulation since the
1994 labour market reform. As labour market intermediaries, they connect labour
demand and labour supply. Once hired by the THA, the worker is sent to render
her services to a client firm, which agrees upon the provision of the worker by
the THA. There exists a standard labour contract for a limited duration between
the THA and the worker, and a commercial contract (called assignment contract)
between the THA and the firm. Therefore, workers remain on the THA’s payroll
while working for the client firm, i.e., these workers become part of a triangular
relationship between the worker, the THA and the firm in which the work is
performed (see Muñoz-Bullón, 2002, or Muñoz-Bullón and Rodes, 2003).
From the point of view of the worker, recent studies show that the large major-
ity of workers choose a THA as a means to find permanent work and to supplement
income during job search, while a minority prefer to stay as THA workers (Co-
hany, 1996 and 1998; Steinberg, 1994 and 1998). In addition, it is reasonable
to think that some individual job applicants would have fewer opportunities to
obtain a range of potential jobs by their own (Belous, 1989), and that some of
them would appreciate the greater flexibility in scheduling that THA employment
offers (Blank, 1998).
Client firms adduce a variety of reasons when asked why they resort to agency
workers. The first reason has to do with THA employment as a flexibility device
in the face of fluctuating product demand. In addition, some companies want to
Hence, workers are not being underclassified when they begin working through THAs.
4In any case, due to the absence on wages, this paper does not ask the question related to the
size of the returns to occupational mobility in terms of earnings and subsequent wage growth.
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buffer core employees from business fluctuations, when the production process is
discontinued or plants or offices shut down. There is little doubt that agency and
other forms of contingent employment do give managers this flexibility (Abraham,
1990; Blank, 1998; Houseman, 1997; Nollen, 1996). The second reason has to do
with a desire to reduce labour costs (especially fixed labour costs). If temporary
workers are paid less than core employees, labour compensation goes down. In
addition, client firms want to ease management tasks (administration, paper work
and personnel services).
Those demand-side motivations have constituted the main focus in the liter-
ature of THAs. This popular view has found its way into much of the academic
literature, where it is presented as a major reason for the rapid growth of con-
tingent work (Abraham, 1988; Davis—Blake and Uzzi, 1993; Tsui, Pearce, Porter
and Hite, 1995). Although obviously useful and important, these explanations are
still a matter of controversy, since hard evidence on this issue is certainly difficult
to come by. More importantly, although we are not questioning those studies, we
regard them as incomplete. THAs not only provide “just—in—time” or contingent
workers to firms under unplanned circumstances. Some firms outsource all the
screening processes of some categories of workers to these agencies, so that every
potential candidate must start working initially through a THA. Indeed, recent
surveys indicate that client firms value THA contracting as a device to prospect
among temporary workers for candidates who could be recruited to fill vacan-
cies on a permanent basis (Ballantine and Ferguson, 1999; Houseman, 1997). In
these cases, THA employment will be basically determined by the incidence of the
asymmetric information problem which both the THA screening services and the
initial assignment through the THA (which, indeed, consists of a “probationary”
assignment) are meant to solve. Hence, client firms will be able to realize savings
in labour costs by not having to recruit or select candidates (tasks for which they
may not have time or expertise).
How may THA work affect individual’s opportunity for career advancement
and future wages? Suppose that two otherwise identical individuals end up work-
ing in the same job of the same firm, but one of them placed by a THA and the
other not. Will their career paths differ as a result of the different hiring pro-
cedures they have gone through?5 To answer this question, we can consider an
economy in which neither individuals –who differ in the comparative skills with
which they can perform different jobs– nor the market knows workers’ abilities,
and where, in addition, firms act competitively and no intermediation by THAs
were possible. In this context, given that promoting the individual constitutes a
signal of high ability, the actual employer –who knows worker’s ability after the
first employment period– may prefer to inefficiently underpromote some of their
5The term ‘path’ refers to the ability to increase one’s labor earnings over time.
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employees. Otherwise, the employer would have to pay a too high wage to the
promoted workers, since competition for workers would lead the employer to pay
their expected productivity given the assignment (Waldman, 1984).
On the contrary, in a labour market with vertically-differentiated agents –i.e.,
good workers are good for any task– THAs act as a screening device available to
firms.6 They will only accept workers who are sufficiently good, so that the most
productive individuals will be identified. Becoming a THA worker becomes, thus,
a publicly available part of the individual’s employment history: the ability certifi-
cation by the THA reveals worker’s quality and –as a result of the attenuation of
information asymmetry among employers in the economy– the previously com-
mented missasignment of workers to tasks can be confined. If the actual employer
intended to underpromote some of the workers –exploiting, again, the private
information on workers’ true ability level– then the THA would have incentives
to reassign the temporary worker to another firm, since other firms would bid for
worker’s services.
Available qualitative evidence suggests, indeed, that client firms especially ap-
preciate the fact that THAs assume responsibility for staff selection, an often
complex task which is all the more burdensome when short—term recruitment is
involved (Bronstein, 1991). Indeed, in some sectors, THAs represent the primary
way to auditing and hiring new workers (Autor, 2001). In this same vein, House-
man (1997) found that one—fifth of client firms in the US addressed to THAs as
a source for future recruitment.7 Thus, evidence confirms the notion that THAs
generate employees with high productivity, suggesting that client firms regard
agency workers as being more “reliable” than direct applications from prospective
employees. In particular, hiring THA workers to monitor them and then to offer
permanent positions only to those who perform well seems to have become a com-
mon strategy by client firms. This pre—selection role is likely to be an important
determinant for high—skilled individuals to address to THAs. As opposed to low—
skilled workers, they will face incentives to collect the gains from THA—work in
terms of occupational mobility. Even though the majority of THA contracts are
based on unskilled jobs (59 per cent in 1998) in Spain, THA workers are not in
general badly educated. In 1998, 76% of THA contracts were held by individuals
in possession of secondary or higher education, while only 64% of total registered
contracts held this qualification level.8 Therefore, one will expect this cohort of
6Alternatively, in a labor market with costly search and horizontally-differentiated agents
(i.e., with match-specific heterogeneity) THAs may also help to achieve an efficient assignment
of workers to jobs.
7The use of fixed—term labor contracts in general has also been presented as a source of
candidates for permanent jobs. For instance, Abraham (1988), found that 23 percent of firms
that used “flexible” forms of employment intended to identify adequate candidates for permanent
jobs
8These figures come from the Spanish Ministry of Labor’s statistical bulletin. Similarly,
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positively—selected THA individuals to be promoted out of low—level occupations
and into higher—level occupations. Moreover, they can be expected to advance
more quickly in their careers.
However, people with lower than average skills will be more likely not to ad-
dress to a THA because only the relatively more able will find it worthwhile to
work through the agency. Among this pool of negatively—selected THA workers,
other motivations rather than the screening services provided by the THA will be
behind their contracting by the intermediary. This might occur, for instance, in
replacement or substitution contracts, where urgency constitutes the main deter-
minant of addressing to a THA, or when client firms are not hiring for jobs where
tested ability is important (i.e., unskilled jobs). In those cases, screening may not
constitute the main added value in the provided services by the THA, since client
firms are not searching for candidates on a permanent basis.
3. Data and variables
The data source we use are work histories of 19,778 individuals who may or may
not be working for a THA in some moment of their work history. This informa-
tion was collected from administrative data belonging to Social Security records.
The database has information on all employment (and non—employment) spells
of workers in the sample, from 1990 to 1999.9 The work history data provided
includes information about the age and gender of workers, the occupation held,10
the dates when the employment spell starts and ends, the type of Social Security
system for the worker, the reason for the termination of the spell (voluntary quit,
dismissal or retirement), the Spanish province where the employment spell took
place, an identifier of whether each employment spell is accomplished through
a THA or not and, finally, the type of contract held by the worker (temporary
or permanent). In order to avoid capturing changes that are solely attributable
to good or bad years, we also control for the economic cycle through the annual
growth rate of the gross domestic product, and to mitigate the influence of geo-
graphical location we use both the regional unemployment rate and a dummy for
for the US labor market, Segal (1996) finds that personnel supply services workers are more
educated, on average, than other hourly workers.
9Since in this database we cannot distinguish between unemployment and out of the labor
force –the information we have is simply that workers are not employed at some point of their
history– we address these spells as “non-employment”.
10It must be underlined that the occupation indicates a level in a ranking determined by the
worker’s contribution to the Social Security. It is related to the individual’s level of qualification,
since it collects the required level of qualification for the job. However, it does not collect the
workers’ actual level of qualification but the level of qualification required for the job. For
instance, an individual working in the lowest occupation may well be in possession of an academic
degree. This caveat should be borne in mind throughout the subsequent analysis.
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the region where the employment takes place.11 The Appendix gives a complete
description of the variables used in the estimation process.
We have dropped incomplete observations and kept only those workers affili-
ated to the General System (Régimen General) in order to circumvent the bias in
our estimations that special systems like Agriculture, Fisheries, and so on would
provoke. In order to achieve greater homogeneity, we also eliminate records that
have terminated for reasons other than dismissals or ends of temporary contracts.12
Moreover, we wanted to focus both on changes in occupational levels and on tran-
sitions from temporary to permanent contracts. Therefore, we removed every
observed transition where the initial contract did not consist of a temporary one.
Finally, given that in order to identify our model we use a variable indicating the
proportion of THA contracts over the total of labour contracts and that no data
for this variable was available prior to 1995, we have restricted our sample to those
employment spells beginning from 1995 onwards. Of the initial 19,778 individuals,
selection of valid observations led us to a final sample of 13,571 individuals (or
56,048 spells).
Following the example of other studies using data from Social Security records,13
we have organized occupations into four groups: High, Upper-Intermediate, Lower-
Intermediate and Low Occupation. The specific categories within each group are
detailed in the Appendix. We have also experimented with other ways of group-
ing the occupations. These alternative groupings also support our initial find-
ings, although the results are to be seen most clearly when using our four-class
classification. In addition, we have found that wage differences for this classifica-
tion are also highly significant: 7.51% between the Low and Lower-Intermediate
groups, 37.38% between the Lower-Intermediate and Upper-Intermediate groups,
and 47.51% between the Upper-Intermediate and High ones.14 Therefore, we ex-
pect a change in occupations between these four groups to be a quite important
fact in the economic situation of the worker.
In our data we have a variable identifying the actual employer in each employ-
ment spell along with information about whether or not each employment spell is
accomplished through a THA15. Each observation in our data is represented by a
worker’s change of job, either with the same employer or a new one. This means
that those individuals actually working through a THA may in the following spell
11Five zones are defined: Cataluña, Madrid, South, East and North.
12In this database we cannot distinguish between these two different reasons for termination
of the spell.
13See, for instance, García—Fontes and Hopenhayn (1996), or García—Pérez (1997).
14We would like to thank Samuel Bentolila and Olympia Bover for providing us with this
information.
15Each spell observed through a THA indicates in fact an employment contract with a client
firm. However, we cannot identify whether after a THA spell, the worker begins working directly
with the same client firm.
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go on working through the same THA, change to work through a new THA, or
be hired by a non—THA employer. Similarly, those individuals working directly
for a firm (i.e., without a THA as intermediary) may in the following spell go on
working for the same employer or for a different one.
Sample characteristics for each occupation group are presented in Table 2. In
the highest occupational level, THA workers are predominantly male (63.59%)
and are more likely to be under 30 years—old than their non—THA counterparts;
from Table 2 we also obtain that THA workers in the highest occupational level
are much more likely to downgrade their skill level when moving from one job
to another one than non—THA workers (only 42.86% of THA workers kept their
occupation constant when changing jobs, compared to 86.22% of non—THA work-
ers). However, THA workers present an easier access to permanent contracts. In
the two intermediate groups, THA workers are more likely to be women and also
to be younger than non—THA workers. Moreover, THA workers in the Upper-
Intermediate group are slightly more likely than the other group of individuals
to upgrade their occupational status when moving between different employment
spells (1.93% versus 1.80%) but less likely to find a permanent contract (4.42%
versus 6.95%). Lower—Intermediate THA workers are more likely to maintain
constant and avoid demotions than non—THA workers, but also less likely to
achieve occupational upgrading or to get a permanent contract than their non—
THA counterparts. Finally, Table 2 shows that occupational transitions within
the Low category group are not very common, and that, when they occur, the
collective of non—THA workers enjoy relatively easier access to upward mobility.
4. Econometric modelling
Wewant to know to what extent, given an occupation of origin, THA—intermediated
work increases the likelihood of upward occupational mobility. Occupational
change is defined to occur either when the occupational category in two suc-
cessive employment spells is different or when a transition from a temporary
to a permanent contract is observed. This two—fold concept –focusing on the
occupational category and the type of contract– allows us to study both the
shifts along the occupational trajectory and the important issue of whether THAs
make easier the transition to a permanent contract. Therefore, it allows us to
make a distinction between the types of contract held, which are not identifiable
through occupational categories or codes. Specifically, individuals’ job—to—job
transitions will be studied through the use of an ordered categorical dependent
variable taking values from 0 to 3, where value 0 represents the worst outcome
–occupational demotion and both the actual contract and the following one are
temporary– value 1means maintaining the same occupational category and spells
being temporary—temporary, value 2 reflects upward occupational mobility and
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spells being temporary-temporary, and, finally, value 3 represents a transition
from a temporary contract to a permanent one no matter the change in the
occupational level. Hence, we have estimated an ordered probit model on this
dependent variable.16
However, we cannot simply consider the effect of working for a THA as only
that of another explanatory variable in the ordered probit model, since individual
self—selection is potentially a concern (as explained in Section 2 above). One of
the main reasons for addressing to a THA is the likelihood of upward occupa-
tional mobility after leaving the THA that the individual can enjoy due to the
screening role the latter is playing in the labor market. The individual earns
wages by gaining employment through the THA and acquires both skills and an
ability certification by the THA which can enhance the individuals’ chances of
achieving a better job after leaving the intermediary. The cost the individual
must undergo through the THA assignment process consists of the risk of not
passing the minimum ability level required in the tests implemented by the THA,
and, in case he does, the uncertainty associated to the likelihood of receiving only
brief assignments by the THA interspersed with relatively long periods of un-
employment (Bronstein, 1991), or, for instance, the possibility of receiving lower
wages than direct temporary hires by the client firm17. Therefore, individuals will
only incur the costs associated to addressing to a THA if they think that after
spending a part of their working life in a temporary assignment they can increase
their chances of occupational upgrading, either through the access to a job with a
higher occupational level or through eventually achieving a permanent contract.
As a result, the unobservable characteristics which prompt individuals to apply
to THAs may also be affecting their relative chances of promotion. Consequently,
merely to control for the observable characteristics when explaining occupation
changes is insufficient, since some additional process may be influencing those
changes, namely, the factors that determine whether or not an individual works
through a THA. The observed distribution of occupational changes will be influ-
enced by this choice, and the use of standard regression techniques would lead to
16We also estimated two different probit models, one for upward occupational mobility, and
the other for downward occupational mobility across each job—to—job transition. Results do not
significantly differ from the ones presented with the use of our ordered probit model. More-
over, although we have also applied an alternative multinomial specification, the hypothesis of
independence of irrelevant alternatives is rejected.
17Applying to a THA to find a job may, therefore, imply an opportunity cost for the workers.
For instance, Blank (1998) found that the median THA worker receives only 63 percent of the
wage received by full—time workers. In this sense, it may well be the case that workers decide
to apply to THAs only after direct methods to find a job have proved fruitless. Consequently,
the group of THA workers may be those who inherently have more difficulty in finding jobs by
themselves.
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inconsistent estimates of the parameters.18
In order to analyze this issue, we propose a switching model which describes
the choice of THA work along with occupation transitions under the assumption
that the assignment of individuals to the two groups is by self—selection rather
than by random assignment. The model can be summarized by two equations: a
selection equation and an occupation equation. The selection equation is given by:
z∗ = β 0sxs + us (4.1)
where z∗ is the difference between benefits and costs of addressing to a THA. A
THA employment spell is observed if z∗ > 0, and a non—THA spell otherwise.
Vector xs collects worker characteristics, and us captures unobserved individual
specific heterogeneity influencing both the decision of addressing to a THA and
the one by the THA of hiring the worker.
The occupation equations –one for each possible selection choice– are given
by:
y∗k = β
0
ckxck + uck, k = 0, 1 (4.2)
where k = 1 denotes THA and k = 0 denotes non—THA.19 That is, conditional on
the individual’s choice of THA versus non—THA work in each employment spell,
occupational upgrading (i.e., a promotion through the occupational groups con-
sidered or through getting a permanent contract) may or may not be achieved.
The choice of whether or not to apply to a THA enters endogenously into the
occupation equations by estimating each equation conditional on the THA deci-
sion of the worker. This occupation equation is estimated by an ordered probit
model with four possible outcomes depending on observed heterogeneity and the
term uck which captures the unobserved heterogeneity influencing the process of
occupational mobility for both THA and non—THA workers.20 The different cut-
points for the ordered dependent variable are represented by c1j and c0j where c10
and c00 are set equal to zero.
However, if xs does not contain at least one element that is excluded from the
occupation equations, the model is not well identified.21 Therefore, satisfactory
18To be more precise, not only the worker’s decision of whether or not to address to a THA
to find a job needs to be taken into account. In addition, the THA decision of whether or not
to hire the worker is also relevant, given that we observe the worker in a THA spell only if she
has actually been hired by the THA. However, the database has no available information on
individuals who addressed to THAs but who were not finally hired by them.
19Each employment spell is independently considered for each individual. Hence, the same
individual may have THA and non-THA observations.
20Imposing that unobserved heterogeneity in both THA and non-THA processes is the same
does not change the results, although the unique correlation coefficient can be better identified
in this latter case.
21Although, given the non-linearity of the model, it can also be just functionally identified.
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identification requires data on factors that affect the value of addressing to a THA
but do not directly affect occupation transitions. We have selected one variable
from labour statistics that, given worker’s characteristics, we consider to be un-
related to occupation changes but is still related to the switching behavior. This
variable is the proportion of THA assignment contracts in each province and year
over the total of temporary contracts. Whether a worker does or does not apply
to a THA may well be correlated with the relative importance of THA contracts
in the relevant province (so that as this number increases, more workers are likely
to consider those intermediaries as potential employers). In addition, it is unlikely
for THA to locate in areas with the greatest fraction of “upward mobile” work-
ers, since the decision of where to geographically locate the THA premises will be
rather expected to depend on the volume of client firms’ demand at each location.
Therefore, in the analyses below, we include this variable as another determinant
of the selection equation, but we exclude it from the occupation equations.22
Hence, the switching model can be rewritten as:
THA: y∗ = y∗1 if z
∗ > 0
non—THA: y∗ = y∗0 if z
∗ ≤ 0
(uc, us1,us0) ∼ N(0,Σ)
where z∗, y∗1 and y
∗
0 are given by equations (4.1) and (4.2) and Σ is the covariance
matrix of the error terms. As usual in switching models, we are able to estimate
the correlation coefficient between us and uc1 and between us and uc0.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Comments on estimates
The estimations of the switching model for each occupational group are pre-
sented in Tables 3-6. The model with “endogenous THA use” accounts for
self—selection, while the model with “exogenous THA use” imposes exogeneity
of THA—intermediated work in the occupation equation –that is, it constrains
the correlations between THA (ρs1) and non—THA (ρs0) error terms, respectively,
and that of the selection equation to be equal to zero.
Some comments for the four groups of individuals can be made from the esti-
mated selection equations. Age –a proxy for labor market experience– presents
an important negative impact on the probability of working for a THA in any
22The predicted power of this instrumental variable is based on its variation across provinces
and years. In fact, the coefficient of variation of this variable is larger than 53% in all the years
considered.
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occupational group (except for the upper—intermediate one). That is, young peo-
ple are much more likely to be working through THAs than other workers. As
regard gender, THA workers are more likely to be men than women, except in the
Upper-Intermediate occupation. However, the effect of gender changes with age.
For instance, in the highest occupational group, it is only men under 41 years-old
who are more likely to address THAs than women, while in the lowest category it
is only men under 24 years—old who are relatively more attracted by THAs than
women. In addition, workers in those Spanish provinces that have larger yearly
proportions of THA contracts are more likely to work for THAs. Furthermore,
workers are less likely to apply to THAs the larger the growth rate of the gross do-
mestic product –which indicates that the THA business cycle dependence can be
considered as countercyclical. The provincial unemployment rate has a significant
positive impact for the two intermediate qualification groups –i.e., in provinces
with higher unemployment, the likelihood of addressing to a THA is greater.
Occupation equations for each group reflect the impact of individual variables
on the likelihood of occupational upgrading from the actual job to the following
one. Estimated coefficients vary in both models due to the existence of endogeneity
in the THA indicator. Given that for every qualification group at least one of
the correlation coefficients between the selection and the occupation equations is
significant, we keep attention only over the results which controls for endogenous
THA use (Table 5).
Age has a positive impact on the likelihood of occupational upgrading (except
for the lowest occupational group). Therefore, older workers are more likely to
upgrade their occupation, that is, they are more likely to achieve steeper wage
improvements. The age profile is concave. The effect of gender depends on
most cases on age. For instance, THA men above 50 years—old in the Lower-
Intermediate group and those above 30 years—old in the Low group are more
likely than similar women to enjoy better promotion prospects.
We have also included the duration of the non—employment spell between
two jobs as an explanatory variable. Two effects may be at work here. On the
one hand, those who –while unemployed– face more rapid skill depreciation,
might be more likely to accept a job requiring a qualification level below the ones
of previously—held jobs. On the other hand, staying more time unemployed may
allow the worker to increase her ability to look for better jobs, so that the likelihood
of better matches could be increasing with the duration of the unemployment spell.
We find that the net effect, when significant, is negative for all workers but those in
the Low qualification group. That is, the skill depreciation effect dominates for all
workers but those in the lowest one. Moreover, except for the Lower—Intermediate
group, the effect is even more negative for THA workers, which could be due to
the fact that unemployment represents a bad signal for those individuals (see
García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón, 2003).
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The effect of tenure on the job (i.e., the duration of the actual employment
spell) is always positive, both for THA and non—THA individuals. As tenure in
the current job increases, the accumulation of human capital can be larger and,
therefore, the probability of upward occupational mobility is higher.
Looking at the unobserved characteristics, the signs of the correlations for
selectivity allow us to draw interesting conclusions. The correction for sample
selection gives a significant and positive estimate for the correlation coefficient in
the occupation equation for THA workers in the High group. This indicates that
expected occupational promotion of those highly qualified individuals who choose
to work for a THA may be higher than that of a random individual from the
entire sample for given characteristics. And, conversely, for THA workers in the
Low occupational group the maximum likelihood gives a significant and negative
sign for the correlation coefficient, which means that their expected occupational
promotion prospects may be lower than the expected chances of upgrading for
a random individual from the sample. There is, therefore, positive selection for
THA workers in the highest occupational group and support for negative selection
of THA workers in the lowest one. We return to this issue in the following section
where we directly address the question whether individuals engaged through THAs
would have performed as well as non—THA ones, had they decided to look for a
job on their own.
5.2. Expected occupational promotion chances and self—selection
Interpretation of these results is easier by considering predicted probabilities of
occupational upgrading (Tables 7a and 7b). Table 7a reports unconditional prob-
abilities taking into account the self—selection problem, while Table 7b does not.
There are important differences between both models, which are attributed to the
problem of self-selection. In the model with endogenous THA use, the likelihood
of having to accept a new job with lower skill requirements is higher for non—THA
workers but for the highest occupational group. However, a very important result
is that the probability of attaining a permanent contract in this model is much
larger for THA workers than for non—THA ones in the High occupational group:
THA workers enjoy a 39.60% probability of achieving a permanent contract, as
opposed to only 4.98% for non—THA ones. Another interesting finding is that
not accounting for self—selection understates the differences between THA and
non—THA workers in the High and Low groups: in the model with exogenous
THA use, THA individuals in the High qualification category only attain perma-
nent contracts with a 11.97% probability. Estimates of occupational promotion
are also biased for the Low occupational groups when the potential self—selection
is not taken into account, since non—THA workers only achieve permanent con-
tracts with a 4.67% probability (as opposed to the 13.63% when correcting for
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self—selection) and keep constant their category with a 81.89 % probability (as
opposed to the corrected probability of 65.25%).
Going one step further, we can work out what the predicted conditional proba-
bilities would be, in order to study counterfactual scenarios. Our aim is to compare
the probability of occupational upgrading of a THA worker conditional on having
been engaged by a THA and its counterfactual, i.e., the probability of occupa-
tional upgrading if the worker had not been hired by a THA. Table 8 shows these
estimated probabilities. In the first panel (Table 8a) the upgrading probabilities,
conditional on having been hired by a THA, are presented; in the second panel
(Table 8b) the ones conditional on not having been contracted by a THA are
shown. In this table we have the contrafactual probability for a non—THA worker
in the case she had been hired by a THA.
Upgrading and demotion probabilities of those hired by THAs can be compared
to their counterfactuals. If we compare columns 1 and 2 in Table 8a, we observe
that THAworkers in the highest category group probably took the correct decision
in choosing to work through a THA since –even though it would have been
less likely to suffer a demotion (8.22% as opposed to the actual 39.94%)– their
probability of achieving a permanent contract is much higher than the one they
would have enjoyed by working on their own (17.09% as opposed to 10.06%). A
similar result is to be seen in the case of a non—THA worker (columns 1 and 2
in Table 8b): her probability of achieving a permanent contract would have been
substantially larger if she had been hired through a THA (62.81% as opposed to
the actual 5.56%). Moreover, non—THA individuals in this group would have more
easily avoided movements down the skill ladder to an occupation requiring less
skill than their previous occupation had they been hired through the intermediary
(5.73% as opposed to the actual 8.21%).
As for THA workers in the Upper—Intermediate group, results are better than
in case they had not been engaged by a THA, both in terms of exiting from
a temporary contract and of avoiding occupational demotion (columns 3 and 4
in Table 8a). However, results are not so favorable for the counterfactuals of
non—THA individuals in this occupational level (see columns 3 and 4 in Table
8b). Therefore, our predictions are not clear enough for this category level, a
result which is also obtained when analyzing the Lower—Intermediate occupational
group.
Finally, the performance of THA workers in the Low occupational group is
always worse than that of non—THA ones. Had the former not addressed to the
intermediary to look for a job, we note that both the counterfactual probability of
achieving a permanent contract and that of occupational upgrading are substan-
tially higher (16.09% as opposed to the actual 1.26%, and 23.28% as opposed to
the actual 8.66%, respectively). Moreover, the performance of non—THA workers
in this occupational group would have been worse than in case they had been
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engaged through the intermediary. These results show that low—qualified THA
workers are being negatively self-selected.
6. Conclusion
This paper has examined one of the patterns of occupational mobility related to
THA work in Spain. In particular, our emphasis has been on the extent to which
THA—intermediated work allows individuals to achieve occupational upgrading.
Our empirical testing of the dynamics of workers’ occupational level has been
undertaken in such a way as to take into account the possible existence of self—
selection into THA—intermediated work. That is, we have developed a switching
model which allows us to examine the use of THAs along with occupational tran-
sitions across jobs under the possibility that the assignment of individuals to THA
and non—THA work is by self—selection rather than by random assignment.
We have found evidence that highly—qualified workers are positively selected
compared to non—THA ones in Spain. The benefits for being engaged through this
intermediary translates into an easier access to permanent contracts for individuals
in this highest occupational category. On the contrary, results also indicate the
existence of negative self—selection among THA workers in the lowest qualification
group. Had workers from this category not been hired by a THA, they would
have enjoyed a higher likelihood of both accessing to permanent contracts and of
avoiding occupational demotion.
Interpreting our results in the framework of the demand and supply—side mo-
tivations for addressing to a THA, the THA screening role appears as a relevant
determinant for high—skilled individuals to address to a THA, though not among
the lowest qualified ones. Among the latter, therefore, other motivations instead
of the screening THA services are under the use of this intermediary. Although
more detailed work is needed in this area, our results may help to promote a
recognition of the social value of Temporary Help Agencies. Even though the
present paper has not focused upon the satisfaction displayed by workers who
are in this type of employment arrangement, on the amount of wages or fringe
benefits they may be receiving, or on the actual level of provision of social protec-
tions for these THA workers, we have offered one reason why THA work should
be recognized as a valid form of employment in its own right, albeit one that is
substantially different to the standard employment relationship. In particular,
we have found that THA work should not be entirely relegated to a second—class
status where temporary workers are doomed to occupational stagnation, because
of reduced opportunities of advancement or little opportunity to use their skills
at the workplace. Although this may be true for certain types of workers, as a
general statement about the entire labour market, it is simply not true.
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Appendix: Occupation category groups and explana-
tory variables
The four category groups are the following: High Occupation collects
the three highest levels in the ranking, that is, 1 (ingenieros and licenciados),
2 (ingenieros técnicos, peritos and ayudantes titulados) and 3 (jefes admin-
istrativos and de taller). Upper-Intermediate Occupation collects levels 4
(ayudantes no titulados), 5 (oficiales administrativos) and 6 (subalternos).
Lower-Intermediate Occupation collects levels 7 (auxiliares administrativos)
and 8 (oficiales de primera and segunda). Finally, Low Occupation collects
levels 9 (oficiales de tercera and especialistas) and 10 (peones).
The explanatory variables used in this study are the following ones:
• Gender: 1 for men and 0 for women
• Age: age of the individual at the beginning of the employment spell
• Unemployment duration: length (in months) of the unemployment spell following
the actual employment spell.
• Employment duration: length (in months) of the actual employment spell.
• %THA contracts: percent proportion of the number of THA assignment contracts
registered in each province and year corresponding to the beginning year of the
employment spell.
• Gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate: for the selection (category) equa-
tions, this variable collects the yearly growth rate of the GDP for the beginning
(ending) quarter of the employment spell.
• Unemployment provincial rate: for the selection (category) equations, this vari-
able collects the unemployment rate for the province and the first quarter of the
beginning (ending) year of the employment spell.
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Table 1
Temporary contracts managed by THAs in Spain
Year
Temporary
contracts (1)
Temporary contracts
managed by THAs (2)
Proportion
[(2)/(1)]*100
1995 5,519,350 361,633 6.55%
1996 8,273,175 748,601 9.05%
1997 9,386,084 1,260,524 13.43%
1998 10,692,315 1,707,842 15.97%
1999 12,017,063 1,892,284 15.75%
Source: Spanish Ministry of Labor
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Table 2
Main sample characteristics
High
Occupation
Upper-interm.
Occupation
Lower-interm.
Occupation
Low
Occupation
THA No THA THA No THA THA No THA THA No THA
Total 217 1,343 1,811 2,950 13,240 8,538 18,336 9,613
Unempl. Dur. 18.90 24.71 19.97 25.17 18.14 26.57 17.94 33.53
Empl. Dur. 168.91 76.39 67.64 75.40 37.31 89.55 31.11 93.97
Male 63.59 30.23 42.08 55.42 34.05 60.46 64.21 67.72
Age 16-24 35.94 11.17 35.01 29.22 43.09 29.11 46.11 34.01
Age 25-29 28.57 20.03 22.25 26.98 22.08 18.72 21.95 18.32
Age 30-39 26.73 64.56 20.76 35.59 20.37 41.51 21.81 38.73
Age ≥ 40 8.76 4.24 21.98 8.20 14.46 10.67 10.14 8.95
Destination:
Permanent 17.05 5.66 4.42 6.95 2.39 5.32 1.23 5.70
Temporary:
with upgrading — — 1.93 1.80 3.48 4.85 8.75 13.59
with = qualif. 42.86 86.22 70.40 70.41 86.74 79.26 90.02 80.71
with demotion 40.09 8.12 23.25 20.85 7.39 10.58 — —
Notes: The values in the top row indicate the number of spells in
each occupation (but not individuals). All variables are proportions
with respect to the first row except Empl. Dur. and Unempl. Dur.
which represent the mean duration, in days, of the actual employment
spell studied and of the intermediate spell of non—employment between
this and the following employment spell.
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Table 3
Estimation results for the Selection Equation with endogenous THA
use (t—ratios in parentheses)
High
Upper-
Intermediate
Lower-
Intermediate Low
Constant 8.148 (5.66) 4.732 (9.96) 2.467 (12.36) 2.925 (16.17)
Gender:Male 2.882 (5.91) -1.865 (-10.42) 0.277 (3.45) 0.549 (8.07)
Gender*Age -0.070 (-4.57) -2.756 (-9.15) -0.023 (-8.74) -0.023 (-10.41)
Age -5.881 (-6.95) 0.398 (8.10) -2.439 (-19.16) -1.331 (-11.73)
Age2 0.879 (6.57) 0.459 (6.48) 0.405 (19.47) 0.195 (10.87)
% THA Contracts 6.830 (2.41) 11.118 (2.90) 8.791 (15.66) 2.471 (5.16)
GDP growth rate -0.138 (-1.73) -0.018 (-3.96) -0.138 (-9.01) -0.170 (-12.63)
Unempl. provincial rate 0.004 (0.36) 0.050 (8.57) 0.041 (22.14) -0.001 (-0.38)
Notes: Equations also include dummies for the specific occupa-
tions within each of the four groups.
Table 4
Estimation results for the Selection Equation with exogenous THA
use (t—ratios in parentheses)
High
Upper-
Intermediate
Lower-
Intermediate Low
Constant 8.056 (5.66) 4.749 (10.01) 2.479 (12.41) 2.929 (16.17)
Gender: Male 2.873 (5.90) -1.883 (-10.55) 0.279 (3.46) 0.542 (7.96)
Gender*Age -0.069 (-4.53) -2.759 (-9.19) -0.023 (-8.76) -0.023 (-10.35)
Age -5.742 (-6.86) 0.398 (8.13) -2.443 (-19.94) -1.338 (-11.77)
Age2 0.857 (6.49) 0.464 (6.53) 0.405 (19.50) 0.196 (10.89)
% THA Contracts 6.098 (2.10) 11.103 (2.88) 8.720 (15.49) 2.520 (5.16)
GDP growth rate -0.172 (-2.16) -0.018 (-4.02) -0.137 (-8.95) -0.172 (-12.74)
Unempl. provincial rate 0.003 (0.31) 0.051 (8.72) 0.041 (22.05) -0.0001 (-0.04)
Notes: Equations also include dummies for the specific occupa-
tions within each of the four groups.
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Table 5
Estimation results for the Occupation Equation with endogenous
THA use (t—ratios in parentheses)
High
Upper-
Intermediate
Lower-
Intermediate Low
THA workers
Constant -8.928 (-4.12) -1.751 (-1.85) -0.214 (-0.73) 0.099 (0.37)
Gender: Male -0.505 (-0.45 ) -0.619 (-1.24) -0.402 (-3.59) -1.166 (-10.09)
Gender*Age -0.002 (-0.05) 0.021 (1.43) 0.008 (1.89) 0.039 (9.54)
Age 6.214 (4.40) 1.635 (2.32) 0.995 (4.32) -0.471 (-2.81)
Age2 -0.902 (-4.114) -0.260 (-2.44) -0.141 (-3.70) 0.020 (0.75)
Unemployment duration -0.025 (-0.62) -0.103 (-6.83) -0.009 (-2.82) 0.063 (11.44)
Employment duration 0.045 (2.89) 0.039 (9.34) 0.053 (15.01) 0.052 (9.96)
GDP growth rate 0.231 (1.77) 0.044 (0.88) 0.081 (3.72) -0.077 (-3.82)
Unempl. provincial rate -0.011 (-0.61) -0.004 (-0.45) -0.009 (-2.42) -0.008 (-2.57)
Threshold c1 1.3076 (4.43) 2.434 (35.44) 3.121 (78.53) 0.953 (31.09)
Threshold c11 — 2.636 (35.12) 3.561 (74.06) —
ρs1 0.609 (2.09) 0.063 (0.19) -0.153 (-1.26) -0.623 (-4.16)
Non—THA workers
Constant -1.436 (-0.63) -2.041 (-2.30) -0.288 (-0.62) 1.308 (2.19)
Gender: Male -0.176 (-0.20) 0.794 (2.67) -0.343 (-2.61) -0.659 (-3.78)
Gender*Age 0.005 (0.21) -0.025 (-2.84) 0.007 (1.55) 0.023 (3.62)
Age 1.485 (1.02) 1.430 (3.07) 0.718 (2.66) -0.794 (-3.27)
Age2 -0.197 (-0.87) -0.203 (-2.86) -0.108 (-2.42) 0.086 (2.21)
Unemployment duration -0.072 (-5.78) -0.050 (-7.82) -0.056 (-11.17) 0.017 (3.03)
Employment duration 0.048 (8.11) 0.052 (11.06) 0.042 (14.24) 0.053 (12.17)
GDP growth rate 0.170 (2.15) 0.094 (2.49) 0.099 (4.08) -0.045 (-1.71)
Unempl. provintial rate -0.015 (-1.92) 0.004 (0.82) 0.001 (0.33) -0.012 (-4.26)
Threshold c0 3.126 (33.06) 2.194 (22.32) 2.610 (64.23) 0.704 (14.06)
Threshold c01 — 2.326 (22.39) 2.979 (63.15) —
ρs0 -0.127 (-0.29) 0.351 (1.69) -0.155 (-1.31) -0.459 (-2.99)
Mean Log Likelihood -0.833295 -1.38937 -1.17454 -1.01537
Size 1,560 4,761 21,778 27,949
Notes: Equations also include dummies for the occupations within
each of the four groups, and for geographical zones (reference category:
Madrid).
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Table 6
Estimation results for the Occupation Equation with exogenous THA
use (t—ratios in parentheses)
High
Upper-
Intermediate
Lower-
Intermediate Low
THA workers
Constant -7.647 (-3.09) -1.613 (-2.35) -0.083 (-0.304) -0.201 (-0.71)
Gender: Male 0.833 (0.94) -0.711 (-2.71) -0.379 (-3.44) -1.396 (-12.94)
Gender*Age -0.036 (-1.23) 0.024 (2.67) 0.006 (1.57) 0.049 (12.82)
Age 4.737 (3.14) 1.523 (3.44) 0.811 (4.76) -0.230 (-1.30)
Age2 -0.689 (-2.93) -0.244 (-3.39) -0.110 (-3.97) -0.018 (-0.64)
Unemployment duration -0.025 (-0.54) -0.103 (-6.87) -0.010 (-2.82) 0.069 (12.76)
Employment duration 0.056 (4.55) 0.039 (9.33) 0.053 (15.17) 0.059 (11.30)
GDP growth rate 0.233 (1.58) 0.040 (0.83) 0.076 (3.48) -0.053 (-2.49)
Unempl. provincial rate -0.005 (-0.24) -0.005 (-0.72) -0.007 (-2.14) -0.007 (-2.27)
Threshold c1 1.540 (9.60) 2.437 (40.01) 3.139 (125.94) 1.014 (39.41)
Threshold c11 — 2.639 (38.97) 3.583 (117.15) —
Non—THA workers
Constant -1.942 (-1.53) -0.824 (-1.54) 0.157 (0.49) -0.168 (-0.48)
Gender: Male -0.367 (-0.73) 0.435 (2.11) -0.319 (-2.43) -0.928 (-7.07)
Gender*Age 0.010 (0.63) -0.015 (-2.28) 0.005 (1.14) 0.033 (7.78)
Age 1.794 (2.25) 0.895 (2.59) 0.489 (2.37) -0.369 (-1.71)
Age2 -0.244 (-1.91) -0.126 (-2.28) -0.070 (-2.06) 0.019 (0.58)
Unemployment duration -0.073 (-5.98) -0.052 (-8.21) -0.056 (-11.19) 0.019 (3.35)
Employment duration 0.048 (8.04) 0.053 (12.25) 0.042 (15.47) 0.058 (21.02)
GDP growth rate 0.174 (2.19) 0.083 (2.13) 0.093 (3.77) -0.004 (-0.16)
Unempl. provintial rate -0.016 (-2.01) -0.001 (-0.21) 0.004 (1.49) -0.012 (-4.02)
Threshold c0 3.132 (38.24) 2.265 (52.30) 2.630 (100.83) 0.766 (36.16)
Threshold c01 — 2.402 (51.27) 3.002 (97.03) —
Mean Log Likelihood -0.834192 -1.39001 -1.17469 -1.01559
Size 1,560 4.761 21,778 27,949
Notes: Equations also include dummies for the occupations within
each of the four groups, and for geographical zones (reference category:
Madrid).
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Table 7a:
Occupation equation: Unconditional Predictions for Model with
Endogenous THA use
High Upper—Interm. Lower—Inter. Low
No THA THA No THA THA No THA THA No THA THA
Permanent 4.98 39.60 4.40 3.64 3.39 2.39 13.63 0.63
Upgrading — — 1.38 1.93 3.87 3.80 21.10 5.52
= Qualif. 88.06 45.57 67.47 74.44 80.31 88.12 65.25 93.85
Demotion 6.95 14.82 26.74 19.99 12.42 5.69 — —
Table 7b:
Occupation equation: Unconditional Predictions for Model with
Exogenous THA use
High Upper—Inter. Lower—Inter. Low
No THA THA No THA THA No THA THA No THA THA
Permanent 4.72 11.97 5.97 3.19 4.43 1.88 4.67 0.91
Upgrading — — 1.79 1.74 4.73 3.21 13.43 8.00
= Qualif. 88.06 52.24 72.31 73.47 81.15 88.27 81.89 91.08
Demotion 7.22 35.78 19.91 21.59 9.69 6.63 — —
Note: Predicted probabilities are calculated by holding all vari-
ables at their sample mean.
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Table 8a:
Occupation equation: Conditional predictions for THA workers
High Upper—Inter. Lower—Inter. Low
Pr (yNE) Pr(yE) Pr (yNE) Pr(yE) Pr (yNE) Pr(yE) Pr (yNE) Pr(yE)
Permanent 10.06 17.09 1.97 4.29 4.41 3.39 16.09 1.26
Upgrading — — 0.66 1.99 4.51 4.58 23.28 8.66
= Qualif. 81.71 42.97 55.73 70.46 79.85 86.80 60.61 90.08
Demotion 8.22 39.94 41.63 23.24 11.22 5.23 — —
Table 8b:
Occupation equation: Conditional predictions for non—THA workers
High Upper—Inter. Lower—Inter. Low
Pr (yNE) Pr(yE) Pr (yNE) Pr(yE) Pr (yNE) Pr(yE) Pr (yNE) Pr(yE)
Permanent 5.56 62.81 6.89 4.67 2.90 2.29 5.74 0.13
Upgrading — — 1.85 2.13 3.26 3.30 13.64 1.78
= Qualif. 86.21 31.46 70.36 71.33 77.73 85.88 80.61 98.08
Demotion 8.21 5.73 20.89 21.86 16.09 8.53 — —
Note: Predicted probabilities are conditional in each panel on
working through a THA and not doing so, respectively. The con-
trafactual probabilities are in italics.
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